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C entral Asia is overwhelmingly dominated by vast rangelands, of which those classified as usable for grazing cover over 60% of its total area. Governance of this vast resource is an issue of fundamental impor-
tance for the rural population, the majority of whom raise livestock either as 
part of agro-pastoral systems or, in arid regions, as the only viable agricultural 
activity. Formal property rights systems on pastureland introduced since the 
collapse of the Soviet system include state management, common property, 
leasing and private ownership regimes (table 1) [Robinson et al. 2012]. We seek 
here to trace the ideas and interests which have influenced the choice of tenure 
regime by governments, international development organizations (Idos 1) and 
users themselves. In particular we examine whether an environmental dis-
course has been paramount to reform, or whether other agendas, such as 
vested interests or social justice, might have been more important 2.
The high temporal and spatial variability of Central Asian rangelands 
dictates substantial levels of seasonal livestock mobility, which was a feature of 
both historical grazing systems, governed by customary property rights, and 
the collectivised state-managed systems of the Soviet period [Robinson et al. 
2016]. However, the transition to a market economy has affected these mobile 
systems in a number of ways. Although loss of subsidised feed increased the 
necessity for livestock movement, material support for migration either ceased 
or declined. Infrastructure in remote pastures fell into disrepair, reducing the 
means to reach and use these areas. In Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
1. We would like to thank all those in governments and Idos who agreed to be interviewed for 
this work.
2. This paper is based on our work as field researchers or policy advisors on pasture manage-
ment in the case study countries, as well as on interviews conducted for this paper with officials, 
Ido staff and other participants in reform processes. The material from these interviews is not 
identifed to protect anonymity of sources.
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decollectivisation was rapid and accompanied by a collapse in livestock inven-
tories, whilst reform has been more gradual in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
Today, in all five republics stock numbers are rising and the vast majority of 
animals are privately owned. Ownership distributions are characterized by a 
small number of households with commercial flocks or herds, and a larger 
number owning fewer animals, often for subsistence. Small flock sizes initially 
resulted in the loss of economies of scale required for movement, exacerbating 
the abandonment of remote pastures and concentration of livestock around 
settlements. Many households resolve this problem through participation in 
collective herding systems – pooling animals to cover costs of shepherding and 
transport [Kerven et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2010; Vanselow et al. 2012a].
During the regulatory vacuum of the 1990s, access to pasture was deter-
mined by former state farm boundaries, historical use and ownership of key 
infrastructure [Behnke 2003; Cariou 2002]. Some spontaneously emerging 
‘customary’ arrangements quickly came to exhibit characteristics resembling 
those of common property regimes, with user groups defined by village resi-
dence continuing to use pastures assigned to them during the Soviet period 
[e.g. Robinson et al. 2010]. At the other end of the spectrum, commonly 
understood definitions of legitimate user groups and pasture boundaries were 
blurred, and systems exhibited more elements of open access [Behnke et al. 
2016]. Constraints to livestock movement were initially economic rather than 
legal or political. So, as inventories recovered, animals became increasingly 
mobile [Ferret 2015; Kerven et al. 2016a].
Livestock were rapidly privatised in Mongolia whilst pastureland, owned 
by the state, was used informally. Although some customary forms of social 
organization re-emerged, for example the traditional unit of herding camp 
known as the khot ail, institutions to govern pasture use did not. As economic 
conditions in urban areas worsened, during the 1990s many former rural cit-
izens claimed a share of privatized livestock and returned to herding [Müller 
1995]. Far from crashing, livestock numbers increased from 24 million head 
in 1989 to over 33 million animals 3 in 1999 [Fernandez-Giménez and Allen-
Diaz 1999]. After episodes of drought and severe winter (dzud) between 1999 
and 2002, the national herd declined by 30% and many less experienced herd-
ers who had migrated from urban to rural areas lost most of their livestock and 
moved back to towns. During the next crash, which occurred in winter 2009-
2010, about 20% of national herd perished and many more herders returned 
to urban areas. The national herd then recovered quickly and by the end of 
2016, total livestock stood at 56 million head. Overall, in Mongolia livestock 
numbers have almost tripled since the 1990s, but the number of herders is 
declining. As in Central Asia, coordinated pasture management systems dis-
3. Mau, G. and J. Chantsallkham, A Study of Herder groups, their present status, and future poten-
tial, United Nations Development Programme, Mongolia, 2006.
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integrated, and grazing patterns became characterized by out-of-season use 
of reserve and winter pastures, concentrations of herding households near 
settlements and water points and decreasing mobility. Across the region as a 
whole, increasing pressure on pastures is now focussing the attention of policy 
makers on the application of formal legislation to grazing lands.
Environmental discourse: The land degradation narrative
Land degradation on pastures has been perceived as an issue since the late 
Soviet period 4 [Babaev 1985]. Livestock levels reached historical highs in the 
1980s and a number of authors considered that they had exceeded the limits 
that could be supported by natural pastures [Asanov and Alimaev 1990; 
Kharin 2002; Rozanov 1990]. Yet degradation classified as ‘severe’ – compro-
mising the ability of pastures to support livestock production may have cov-
ered a relatively small area and feedback effects on the livestock sector itself 
are difficult to quantify [Robinson 2016; Robinson et al. 2003].
4. I. S. Zonn, et al., Combating Desertification in the Ussr: Problems and Experience, United 
Nations Environmental Programme, Ussr/Unep Publications and Information Support 
Project, Moscow, Ussr, 1982.
Summary of legislation regulating pasture access in case-study countries
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Today, in particular where steep declines in livestock numbers occurred 
together with a loss in mobility, there is a mismatch between livestock and 
grazing resources, leading to pasture recovery in some areas, and degradation 
in others [Alimaev et al. 2008; Robinson et al. 2016; Vanselow et al. 2012b]. 
This situation is particularly extreme in Kazakhstan, although recovery of 
livestock inventories is slowly leading to a re-colonisation of remote pastures 
[Ferret 2015; Kerven et al. 2016b]. In Turkmenistan, where the state remained 
engaged in livestock production and numbers have grown, relatively high 
levels of livestock mobility have persisted and the distribution of animals on 
the resource is probably more even [Behnke et al. 2005; Behnke et al. 2016], 
but at the national level, grazing pressure is perceived to be dangerously high.
Scientific research has revealed the impacts of de-collectivisation to be 
varied and complex, yet policy makers and international organisations have 
continued to stress the catastrophic nature of the pasture degradation prob-
lem 5 and there is a general perception that degradation processes worsened 
following the transition to a market economy [Kharin 2002]. This mismatch 
between grey literature and peer-reviewed material is also evident in Mongolia. 
Recent studies suggest that both livestock and climate change have strong 
effects on Mongolian rangelands at both broad and local scales [Hilker et 
al. 2013; Khishigbayar et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2013], but the extent and relative 
impact of these causes is unclear [Addison et al. 2012; Sankey et al. 2009; 
5. S. Saigal, An Overview: a Regional Synthesis Report on Issues and Approaches to Combat 
Desertification, Asian Development Bank, 2003.
Livestock on village pasture (Kostanai province, Kazakhstan 2016). Photo: E. Morgan
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Wesche et al. 2010]. Long-term empirical studies suggest that although wetter 
rangelands may be at a tipping point [Khishigbayar et al. 2015], effects on the 
desert steppe are more subtle, and there has been little change in the eastern 
steppe [Chantsallkham 2015]. Readers of non-scientific literature would be 
more likely to come away with the impression that ‘desertification’ is both 
widespread and caused almost entirely by livestock [Addison et al. 2012], 
recalling the catastrophe narrative of desertification in the Sahel [Behnke and 
Mortimore 2016; Davis 2012].
Overall, the degradation narrative has been rather simplified, firstly in 
terms of the causality of vegetation change, in which the relative importance 
of climatic drivers and livestock grazing are often poorly understood. Secondly, 
the consequences have also been subject to simplification through lack of rigor-
ous definitions. Little distinction is made between largely botanical alterations, 
of little importance to livestock raisers, losses in pasture productivity affecting 
individual animal performance but not total meat output per hectare, and over-
all long-term loss of economic output. The importance of such distinctions in 
understanding the meaning of pasture carrying capacity has been described by 
rangeland scientists working in Africa [Behnke and Abel 1996]. In temperate 
Asia, the issue can be illustrated by evidence suggesting that Mongolian herders 
do not always equate species changes related to grazing with a loss in suitability 
of pastures for livestock production [Kakinuma et al. 2008].
Whatever the definitions or their accuracy, headline degradation statistics 
prompted a mobilisation of international funding for the newly independent 
states. Scientists and policy makers living through economic collapse found 
that the narrative of degradation became an important leverage for funding. 
Some of these funds have been directed towards legal reform of pastoral land 
tenure, based on the idea that property rights are key to sustainable pasture 
management.
Sustainable pasture management – an evolution in ideas
Academic debates on the impacts of different property rights systems on the 
sustainable governance of rangeland resources have been well documented 
and are thus only briefly summarised here, before we discuss whether these 
ideas have influences policy making in Central Asia.
The first type of discourse, common in the past and still influential today, 
is based on Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ [1968]. This idea was based on 
the assumption that pastures were ‘open access’ systems in which use rights 
are not associated with a limited set of users, allowing anyone to resource 
at any time. As the immediate benefit to individuals of placing more live-
stock on the resource would always be prioritised over the long-term loss of 
grazing productivity to the group, such a situation was predicted to lead to 
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degradation. Subsequently, the observation that true open access systems rare 
and that the ‘tragedy’ was often avoided through forms of common property 
resource management (Cprm), was formalised into economic theory Ostrom 
[1990], and applied to all sorts of commonly held resources. E. Ostrom sug-
gested that such systems of governance could only be effective if a set of 
rules, including defined geographical boundaries and user-group member-
ship, were in place. From this point of view, the near-village ‘common’ pas-
ture existing in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are not true common property 
management regimes as, although they are allocated to the specific group of 
residents, they are not managed by the users themselves, being the responsi-
bility of village mayors (akims).
However, there has also been an increasing understanding that in some 
parts of the world more malleable access rules are also key components of 
pasture use, particularly where inter-annual variation in pasture productivity 
or climatic conditions are large [Fernandez-Giménez 2002; Turner 2011]. This 
emphasis on mobility and flexibility emerged in turn from scientific insights 
into the nature of rangeland-livestock interactions in Africa [Behnke et al. 
1993; Ellis and Swift 1988]. These authors found that in highly variable ‘non- 
equilibrium’ environments climatic factors such as rainfall may have a greater 
impact on range condition than grazing by livestock. Research attention came 
to be focussed on better understanding mobile systems of range management 
and documenting their increasing fragmentation [Reid et al. 2008].
Annual rainfall variability in Central Asia is low compared to other com-
parably arid regions [Gintzburger et al. 2005]. In the regional literature on 
pastoralism, flexibility – in the sense of a climate-driven need to change graz-
ing locations from year to year – does not emerge as a major requirement for 
pastoralists outside Turkmenistan and Mongolia. But throughout the region, 
intra-annual or seasonal mobility is certainly key to exploiting peaks in vege-
tation productivity and avoiding harsh winter snowfall.
Some of these ideas started to influence the policy and practise of Idos 
in pastoral areas 6, which moved away from the promotion of ‘ranching’ type 
systems, towards common property resource management regimes. These 
conveniently complemented the pro-poor stance of many organisations, as 
it was also demonstrated that non-exclusive forms of pasture tenure may 
improve pasture access for poorer households, which are often marginalized 
under privatization schemes, as they unable to afford the transaction costs  to 
obtain contracts, or the labour required for individual herding effort  [Li et al. 
6. See Bromley, D. W. and M. Cernea, “The Management of Common Property Resources: Some 
Conceptual and Operational Fallacies”, World Bank Discussion Papers 57, 1989; World Bank and 
De Haan, Cornelis, “An Overview of the World Bank’s Involvement in Pastoral Development”, 
in Donor Consultation Meeting on Pastoral Natural Resource Management and Pastoral policies for 
Africa organised by Unso (United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office), Paris, 1993 (<https://www.odi.
org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/5431.pdf>).
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2007; Rohde et al. 2006]. The practical application of more open access rights 
into formal property rights systems has been more problematic [Turner 2011], 
although these ideas have influenced African pastoral code design 7 and are 
evident in debates in Mongolia, as we will see.
Some have argued that Cprm is in danger of becoming a new orthodoxy, 
and that its successful implementation depends on the power relationships 
between those with a stake in the resource [Meynen and Doornbos 2002]. 
 C. Upton [2009] notes that the imposition of formal Cprm regimes may lead to 
exclusion when the definition of legitimate users in the formalised system does 
not correspond to the actual group of rights-holders existing under less formal 
arrangements. It has been suggested that, in decentralised management sys-
tems, the state must continue to play role in regulation and conflict resolution 
and that, rather than introducing uniform Cprm models, there may be a need 
for incremental change or local solutions 8 [Leach and Mearns 1996].
7. H.-W. Wabnitz, The Code Pastoral of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Return to the Sources: 
Revival of Traditional Nomads' Rights to Common Property Resources, 2007 (<https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=906985>).
8. T. Behnke and M. Freudenberger, Pastoral Land Rights and Resource Governance. Overview 
and Recommandations for Managing Conflicts and Strengthening Pastoralits’ Rights, United States 
Agency for International Development, 2011.
Small stock, summer pastures (Pamir, Tajikistan, 2007). Photo: S. Robinson
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The convergence of ideas and interests in the development  
of property rights legislation
Although this special issue focusses on the steppe regions of the former Soviet 
Union, those republics in which the new thinking on rangeland governance 
has most influenced reform processes are the mountainous republics of 
Central Asia, and Mongolia. We thus examine these cases first, before asking 
whether changes in those countries have influenced reform in the steppe and 
desert republics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The general chronology 
of reform is summarised for case study countries in Table 1 for comparison.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: donor-driven experiments in Cprm
In Kyrgyzstan, a leasing mechanism, consisting of rental of spatially defined 
parcels of land by individuals or legal entities, was initially introduced for 
pastures. However, it quickly became clear that this system suffered from a 
number of drawbacks. Collective herding groups characterised by fluid mem-
bership were not legal entities and thus found it difficult to register contracts, 
leading to conflicts between such groups and leaseholders. Transaction costs 
were high as separate contracts had to be concluded for each seasonal pasture 
and the system brought in little revenue, as many pastures continued to be 
used informally 9 [Steimann 2011]. Kyrgyzstan is a resource-poor country with 
a policy towards international cooperation which is perhaps the most open 
in Central Asia. It had already decentralized government to a certain extent, 
having elected village authorities. This openness, reliance on foreign financ-
ing, the beginnings of autonomous local power structures, and the real prob-
lems with the leasing system all facilitated an experiment in common property 
management which was almost entirely conceived from outside.
During the period of the leasing system (2002-2009), a number of 
donor-funded projects experimented with models of community participa-
tion in pasture management including group leasehold contracts and sharing 
of leased pasture areas [Esengulova et al. 2008]. Forms of community-based 
management were also trialled 10 and such pilot projects may have contributed 
to winning acceptance of these models amongst policy makers [Bodemayer 
and Fabian 2015]. However, perhaps just as important was the fact that World 
Bank investments in pastures were conditional on the existence of pasture 
9. A. Undeland, Kyrgyz Livestock Study: Pasture Management and Use, World Bank, Bishkek, 
2005. (<https://landportal.info/sites/landportal.info/files/kyrgyz_livestock_pasture_manage-
ment_and_use.pdf>).
10. See S. Bussler, Community Based Pasture Management in Kyrgyzstan: a Pilot Project in 
Naryn Region. Bishkek, Giz, CAMP alatoo, 2011; J. Leake and Y. Azhigaliyev, Demonstrating 
Sustainable Mountain Pasture Management in the Suusamyr valley: Mid Term Evaluation, United 
Nations Development Programme, 2010; United Nations Development Programme (Undp), 
Community-Based Rangeland Management in Temir Village Project, Factsheet, 2006.
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user  associations, contingent on a new law on common property management. 
This law was largely conceived and designed by external consultants with 
expertise in Cprm, international and national Bank staff, who made efforts to 
base it explicitly on local practise. Environmental discourse was a key justifi-
cation for the new law, with arguments based on the idea that the transaction 
costs of leasing remote pastures, combined with annexation of other pastures 
by leaseholders, were barriers to livestock movements, causing degradation of 
pastures near settlements. Provision of pasture access for owners with small 
numbers of animals was also an argument. Key actors in Bishkek, such as the 
Pasture Department staff and parliamentary agricultural committee recog-
nized the issues with the leasing system and some became active supporters 
of change. Resistance was more pronounced from the district and regional 
governments which controlled pasture allocation under the leasing system.
On the passing of the Law on Pastures in 2009, leasehold contracts were 
repealed. Pastures are now allocated to village governments and managed 
by Pasture Committees (Pcs), executive bodies of Pasture User Associations 
(Puas), through annual allocation of pasture tickets to members. Ido inter-
vention did not stop there; a large World Bank investment project financed the 
establishment of Pasture Users Associations and Pasture Committees nation-
wide and a Union of Pasture Users Associations was established to represent 
the interests of the users at the national level.
There has been some research into the administrative quality, inclusivity 
and legitimacy of Pcs [Crewett 2015; Dörre 2015; Shigaeva et al. 2016] and it is 
unclear whether active participation of large numbers of livestock producers 
in such formal groups is yet forthcoming. It has been suggested that the new 
law is based on simplistic ideas of what constitutes a community, which is in 
fact made up of heterogeneous actors with very different livestock wealth and 
interests [Dörre 2015; Jacquesson 2010 ; Kerven et al. 2012], although it seems 
likely that the leasing system exacerbated these even further. Certainly, the law 
is highly prescriptive regarding the structure, function and responsibilities of 
Pasture Committees, placing high expectations on these and leading to high 
turnover of leadership. The new law did not solve problems of livestock mobil-
ity overnight as many of these problems had been economic, rather than legal 
or political [Crewett 2012].
The forms of autonomous pasture management which had started to 
re-emerge before any laws were applied suggests that Cprm as a concept is 
unlikely to be utterly alien to users. The unit upon which the law is based, that 
of the former collective farm, generally reflected both the geographical and 
membership basis upon which many users had continued to understand how 
legitimate primary user rights should be defined. What is new, and perhaps 
alien, is the form in which it has been imposed in terms of the actors on the 
PC, and that the whole official edifice, from the Puas and Pcs to the pasture 
department and the ‘representatives’ of users at national level, has essentially 
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been introduced from above according to a single template, based on ideas 
which had perhaps not fully permeated institutional and scientific thinking 
in the country. It is possible that, rather than taking on the role of democratic 
organisations representing members’ interests, Puas will be perceived as just 
another organ of local government control – the fact that village mayors sit on 
the Pc leads many users to conflate Pcs and village government [Shigaeva et 
al. 2016]. This may create issues of trust regarding payment and use of fees, 
supposed to be invested in pastures and infrastructure. Recent proposals that 
these fees should be paid to central government are unlikely to be an improve-
ment however.
Kyrgyzstan’s reforms influenced those in Tajikistan, where discussions 
began just after the 2009 law was passed. Here, pasture sector reforms were 
undertaken by both Idos and government agencies, with substantial, if cos-
metic, consultation with other stakeholders. The country’s first pasture-spe-
cific legislation was ratified in March 2013, but new amendments and revisions 
to the Law on Pastures are currently undergoing governmental review, pas-
ture-related institutional architecture is still being debated, and diverging 
strategies for implementing the law are unrolling on the ground.
With post-independence land reform legislation passed in the early and 
mid-1990s, the same legal framework was applied simultaneously to both 
arable land and pastures, and encouraged individual exclusive rights. These 
included long-term leaseholds from the state as in Kyrgyzstan, but also per-
manent heritable rights which were theoretically impossible to repeal. During 
this period some pastures were indeed privatized, whilst others remained de 
facto commonly managed, with large regional differences [Halimova 2012; 
Robinson et al. 2010]. This situation had certain social repercussions, and 
there is evidence that some poorer groups, unable to register land, may have 
lost access to pasture.
There appears to have been no single impetus for the creation of pasture 
legislation in the country In 2010, both the Asian Development Bank (Adb) 
and the Tajik branch of the United Nations Development Programme (Undp) 
began uncoordinated exploratory work related to pasture legislation— the 
latter reportedly at the behest of Undp Kyrgyzstan staff seeking a way to alle-
viate transboundary pasture conflicts between the two countries.
The Adb completed its own draft pasture law in 2011, which included 
provisions for the creation of pasture user groups that would manage “com-
munity pasture lands.” It did not, however, seek to overturn existing legisla-
tion that governed privatized pastures on dehqon farm land—former collective 
and state farms that were privatized after independence—so it still allowed 
for some areas of pasture to be managed privately. Perhaps because officials 
feared redistribution of pastures held by elites, the parliament initially refused 
to work on pasture legislation, but later yielded to Undp-requested pressure 
from the president’s office, and the government formed a working group who 
met from 2011-2013 with facilitation from Undp.
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Half of the official working group members were parliamentary officials, 
with the rest being split between ministerial representatives and sector experts, 
all Tajik nationals. Non-members, including Ido staff, communicated their pri-
orities by submitting proposals and reports, presenting to the working group, 
or meeting privately with official working group members. In general, inter-
national staff of Idos drafted articles for the legislation which were then sent 
to the Tajik members of the working group for approval, rejection, or editing.
Though the Adb’s draft legislation was a starting point for discussions 
within the working group, it was rejected and the writing process was started 
anew with help from The German Agency for International Cooperation (Giz). 
The notion of pasture user “unions” (Puus) remained in the final ratified 
version of the 2013 Law on Pastures. However, the current law provides equal 
rights to pasture user groups and individuals, both of whom may apply for 
pasture, decreasing the incentive for common management and ownership. 
Whilst Puus may be established, their ability to access land depends on the 
existence of land available to lease in their locality and on the discretion of 
district authorities to allocate it to them.
The local experts who participated in the process were Soviet-trained 
specialists in livestock and botany whose main concerns related to livestock 
and pasture productivity. As such, rather than having strong opinions about 
individual versus common management, their main priorities were requiring 
pasture management plans, restoring pasture land, and maintaining roads 
and bridges to facilitate mobility. These local experts bemoaned the rent-seek-
ing enclosure of large swaths of pasture by wealthy individuals who didn’t own 
livestock, and strongly recommended that the law require pasture allocation 
Spring-Autumn Pastures above village (Rasht Valley, Tajikistan 2016). Photo: K. Gillin
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to be carried out in proportion to the number of livestock held by those seek-
ing to acquire land, whether they be individuals or Puus. The 2013 Law on 
Pastures vaguely states that pastures should be allocated with consideration 
of livestock numbers, but does not specifically address whether this applies to 
previously privatized pasture areas. There is evidence that in some regions of 
the country large areas of pasture have indeed been privatised by a few indi-
viduals, but geographical variation is significant and because some privatised 
farms are in fact still ‘collectives’. The national statistics on pasture areas and 
private farm ownership do not provide a clear picture of the proportion of the 
population with legal access to pastures [Halimova 2012].
Though Idos stressed from the beginning the need for stakeholder con-
sultations regarding the law, public feedback did not play a role in the law’s 
development. Undp held five large public events for discussion of the law before 
it was ratified, and a group consisting mostly of parliament members made 46 
trips throughout the country to explain the draft law and to receive community 
feedback about how the Law on Pastures should be implemented. After the 
law was passed, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (Ifad) 
inherited Undp’s role as the primary Ido for institutional development of the 
pasture sector. Ifad formed a new working group to revise the law, which – 
unlike before – operated without the involvement of international consultants. 
In October 2015, the group completed a draft of revisions to the law concern-
ing the creation of new central government bodies for the pasture sector and 
rules for fee collection by Puus. Notably, the public consultations conducted 
regarding the first law were not even mentioned during the revision process.
The law’s implementation has been uneven and dependent on Ido par-
ticipation. Those elements of the law relating to pasture assessment and 
monitoring cannot be implemented with the current dearth of funding and 
expertise. Whilst over 300 Puus have been formed nationally, they only exist 
where Ido projects operate, excluding some of Tajikistan’s most livestock- 
dependent areas. Different Idos have employed diverse approaches to both 
the institutional structure of Puus and development of pasture management 
plans, which are required by law but, perhaps more significantly, must be 
approved before the Puus receive funding from international donors. Indeed, 
the importance of Idos’ implementation of the legislation may even eclipse 
their role in drafting it.
Although some longer migrations were affected by loss of state support, 
in many parts of the country, pasture access and management look much as 
they did during the Soviet era, with communities continuing to collectively 
use pasture lands even after they have been privatized on paper, using tra-
ditional communal labour systems (hashar) to maintain infrastructure and 
developing cross-village fodder markets in response to the loss of state pro-
vision of fodder. The legislation up to and including the Law on Pastures 
is perhaps most  relevant when imagining future developments rather than 
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understanding the present. Lacking knowledge of ongoing legislative debates 
and channels to influence legislation, users are most likely to secure access to 
pasture through negotiations at the district level.
Mongolian debates: pasture reform as key political issue
In 1994, the Mongolian parliament passed the Land Law, which contained pro-
visions for the regulation and management of pastureland, including leasing 
of land of up to around 0.5ha around campsites. The working committee con-
sisted of researchers from universities and specialists from the land agency, 
with little Ido involvement. Implementation of winter campsite leasing started 
in 2008, four years after the land law was enacted.
Traditionally winter campsites are used not by individual households, but 
by groups of households known as khot ail whose composition varies from year 
to year and season to season. One troubling aspect of certificate allocation was 
that often only one name appears on an issued certificate, leading to weaker 
claims amongst other users [Fratkin and Mearns 2003]. Herders spontane-
ously perceived pastureland around the campsite to be included in the lease, 
but poorer herders were largely excluded during lease allocation. Formal user 
rights led wealthier herders to use the same camp repeatedly every year, a form 
of increased sedentarisation less commonly observed amongst poorer herders 
with insecure tenure [Fernandez-Giménez and Batbuyan 2004]. Wealthy herd-
ers started using two or more winter campsites, claiming leasing certificates 
for extra sites in the name of other family members. Some move between 
these sites frequently; others split both their herd and family members or hire 
(usually poorer) herding families and use campsites concurrently 11.
Following three dzud years between 1999 and 2002, during which 30% 
of the national herd died, an appeal from the Mongolian government led to an 
influx of aid and of Idos. Working with herder groups helped donors to reduce 
transaction costs of aid provision and these were encouraged to register as 
legal entities, either as Ngos or business cooperatives. Donor organizations 
working with herding groups, such as the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation, the World Bank and Undp subsequently took a leading role in 
the design of legislation on pastures and put these groups at the centre of the 
draft document which eventually emerged.
The draft Pastureland Law provides for long-term leases of pastures by 
herder groups, including members leasing campsites under the 1994 law, and 
sets out a legal status for these groups. However, defining ‘herding groups’ in 
Mongolia is problematic [Undargaa 2017]. In initial drafts, groups were formed 
based on winter pasture use, but in the latest draft of May 2016, one herder 
can be a member of several different pasture use groups at different times 
11. Report on Consultation with Herders on the Draft of the Pasture Land Law in Mongolia, Centre 
for Policy Research, Ulaanbaatar, 2016.
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of the year to accommodate seasonal movement patterns. Proponents of the 
draft suggested that his type of arrangement would maintain flexibility and 
mobility, yet clearly significant administrative resources would be required to 
implement and monitor such a system.
In addition to group user arrangements, a second category – common 
use – includes reserve, corridor and hay collecting pastures, riparian grazing 
close to rivers and lakes, and mineral licks. But there is a lack of clarity in 
the meaning of ‘common use’ and its relation to ‘land use for herder groups’, 
which may lead to conflicts and accelerate degradation [Fernandez-Giménez 
and Batbuyan 2004].
A legal expert commissioned by Undp evaluated conformity of the draft 
law with international environmental standards and identified issues such 
as lack of administrative mechanisms to implement key principles, no com-
prehensive pastureland assessment and planning system, or procedures for 
community engagement and information provision 12. But given the rapidly 
increasing livestock numbers and significant warming trend, there was a 
strong feeling amongst donors that some form of land-use regulation was 
needed to avoid tipping rangelands into degradation.
The importance of rangelands to Mongolian culture and history means 
that any new measure proposing tenure exclusivity is likely generate strong 
debate in parliament [Himmelsbach 2012]. Attempts were also made to obtain 
views from herders and a nationwide consultation organized by the Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture. Herders’ knowledge about the draft Pastureland 
Law varies. As one rangeland researcher put it: ‘although the Pastureland Law 
proposal is posted on the Ministry of Food and Agriculture website, I don’t think 
herders use the internet or send comments’. But generally the consultation found 
a lack of support for the draft. Many perceive use contracts over pasture (even 
for groups), as privatization, to be opposed in any form [Fernandez-Giménez 
and Batbuyan 2004]. They were concerned that such arrangements would 
undermine essential strategies in arid rangeland management such as mobil-
ity and flexibility, which enable herders to access patchy and temporally availa-
ble resources [Fernandez-Giménez 2002]. This might explain why opposition 
was particularly strong in the Gobi region, which has the highest variability 
in pasture resources. Parliament members elected from rural areas tended to 
fall behind this opposition in order to gain votes.
Other opponents of the draft Pastureland Law include rangeland research-
ers, agricultural economists and national Ngo representatives, who suggest that 
it may lead to fragmentation of lands and people and create multiple  structures 
rather solving pasture management issues. These groups, in particular those 
12. I. Hannam, Report to United Nations Development Program Mongolia on Review of Draft 
Pastureland Law of Mongolia, United Nations Development Program Sustainable Grassland 
Management Project, Ulaanbaatar, 2007. 
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working in the field and community coordinators of some wildlife conservation 
organizations, suggest that enforcement of existing laws would be sufficient 
for pastureland management and propose that region-specific pasture use reg-
ulation implemented by nested regulatory institutions could govern mobility 
between counties and provinces. Meanwhile, taxing livestock would reduce live-
stock numbers and promote productivity improvements.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – nationally-led processes and state control
As we have seen, although not always passed into law, Idos have made key 
inputs into draft pasture legislation in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Mongolia. 
How have these ideas and debates permeated legislation in Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan? These republics, with their oil and gas reserves, are less depend-
ent on outside support; whilst both decentralisation and public involvement 
in policy are greater in Kazakhstan, in neither republic have these had much 
influence on pastoral property rights legislation.
In Kazakhstan although other modalities are available, the vast majority 
of pasture is accessed by registered private farms through 49-year leasehold 
agreements. Yet, of the close to 100 million sheep equivalents of livestock in 
Kazakhstan, around 60% belong to households, which have no formal access 
to pasture outside municipal lands designated as common grazing for local res-
idents. 13 Registered private farms, holding around 35% of livestock inventories, 
leased around 38 million ha of pastureland in 2012 – more than the total of all 
municipal lands. Over 80 million ha of state reserve lands are partially used or 
abandoned, but much of this is remote. In contrast to Mongolia or other Central 
Asian republics, mobile collective herding systems are rare in Kazakhstan so it 
is mainly larger owners who use these areas [Kerven et al. 2016b]. Even amongst 
larger owners, longitudinal studies suggest that high user turnover and large 
inter-annual fluctuation in individual herd sizes may also be an argument for 
flexible, or at least easily exchanged, land use rights [idem].
These issues are widely recognised in Kazakhstan and there have been a 
number of attempts at reform 14. An initial draft law by the National Research 
Institute for Pasture and Fodder was submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture 
in 2010 followed by round table discussions in 2012 and 2013 initiated by 
the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament and the agribusiness firm 
Association of Agricultural Cooperatives or AgroSoiuz. These high-level meet-
13. Municipal lands cover around 21 million ha, of which an unknown proportion, usually cov-
ering a defined radius around settlements, constitutes grazing land.
14. I. V. Alimaev, Lervin and A. Sagindykov, On the theme: Analysis of ongoing reform processes in 
the pasture sector of Kazakhstan [Po teme: Analiz tekushchikh protsessov i reform v pastbishchnom 
sektore Kazakhstana], 2015. Report commissioned for the Giz Sustainable Natural Resource 
Use Programme and Dossier on the Draft Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 'On Pastures' [Dos'e 
na proekt zakona Respubliki Kazakhstan "O Pastbishchakh"], Government of Kazakhstan, 
Astana, 2016.
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ings involved the Minister for Agriculture, oblast deputy governors, deputies, 
farmers’ groups and agribusiness representatives, scientists, and foreign 
experts.
The law which was finally passed in 2017 includes provisions for the vol-
untary association of pasture users, pasture management plans to be approved 
by district authorities, and stricter regulation of village pasturelands. However, 
whether the basic modes of access foreseen in the Land Code remain, and if so, 
how individual acquisition via purchase or long term lease can be reconciled 
with biannual pasture use planning processes remains to be seen. Broader 
questions are also under discussion – amendments to the Land Code passed in 
2015 would abolish leasing arrangements and oblige users to purchase land 15. 
The expense of land purchase relative to rental means that such changes would 
have had far reaching consequences had they come into force as planned. 
However, following public protests in 2016 this clause, amongst others, was 
put on hold 16, a moratorium which has since been extended to 2021.
International organisations have not themselves produced draft pasture 
laws in Kazakhstan, but have been involved in demonstration projects with 
a view to legislative development 17. The World Bank currently plans to invest 
in community pasture management projects 18 with a view to improving use 
of remote pastures and improving adaptive capacity in the face of climate 
change. But such projects are at odds with the legal reality of individual 
leaseholds and the absence of any formal ‘community’ pasture to manage 
beyond the village lands.
Turkmenistan’s pastoral property rights arrangements contrast strongly 
with those in Kazakhstan. Pastures are held in state-owned enterprises, whilst 
the majority of animals (accounting for 90-95% of output from the livestock 
sector) are privately owned 19. State animals are managed by private individuals 
according to a leasehold arrangement which also provides access to pasture 
[Behnke et al. 2005]. For non-leaseholding residents, pasture access (and live-
stock mobility) varies widely depending on the extent to which their activities 
are compatible with those of state enterprises. Where livestock raising con-
stitutes the principal activity of an enterprise, access limitations placed on 
private users may be significant, but those enterprises owning few animals 
15. Idem.
16. D. Sholk “Kazakhstan’s Land Reforms”, The Diplomat, June 15, 2016. 
17. L. Mansour, Sustainable Rangeland Management for Rural Livelihood and Environmental 
Integrity Project, Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2012 (<http://www.thegef.org/
sites/default/files/project_documents/3235_3819_Kazakhstan_LD_TE.pdf>).
18. S. Broka, et al., Kazakhstan Agricultural Sector Risk Assessment, Washington DC, World 
Bank, 2016.
19. See Turkmenistan. Agricultural Sector Review, 2012, Fao Investment Centre Studies and 
Reports, Centre Food and Agriculture Organization and State Committee of Statistics of 
Turkmenistan, Statistical Yearbook of Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, 2014.
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in relation to the pasture resources they control, or which focus mainly on 
cropping activities, tend not to actively regulate pasture access by other users 
[Robinson et al. 2015].
In desert areas, direct relationships between residency, user group mem-
bership and physically defined pasture areas are weak and forms of partially 
open access have emerged in some places. Under these informal arrangements 
pasture users, although formally identified with the state enterprise in which 
they live or work, are able in practise to obtain much broader access to graz-
ing across enterprise borders. This may apply to both private and leasehold-
ing livestock herders moving to water points outside their ‘home’ enterprise 
in response to changing seasonal needs for pasture and water, and density 
dependant factors [Behnke et al. 2016; Robinson et al. 2015]. These moves are 
achieved through negotiation between herders themselves, historical prece-
dent and personal relationships with local officials. In areas where relatively 
free movement is possible, there is now empirical evidence that such arrange-
ments naturally lead to a spatial matching of stocking rates to the forage and 
water resources available [Behnke et al. 2016].
This situation, which has arisen without formal property rights for private 
herders, is the goal of policy makers and rangeland scientists across Central 
Asia, who generally deplore the mismatch between pasture resources and 
grazing pressure. But at the same time, livestock numbers are high and grow-
ing; overgrazing is perceived to be a serious problem and the now-familiar 
concentration of livestock owners around larger settlements does also occur in 
Turkmenistan. The response of governments to such a situation is to attempt 
some form of regulation.
The National Climate Change Strategy 20 lists the development of a law on 
pastures amongst its highest priorities. This opened a door to a technical coop-
eration agreement with Giz, which financed a consultative process and drafting 
of a law on pastures. Round table discussions in Ashgabat including lawyers, 
scientists and representatives of government bodies engaged in the agricul-
tural and livestock sectors, revealed that the dominant discourse amongst both 
researchers and policy makers drew on the idea that only highly secure and 
long-term land rights could foster environmental protection and investment. 
A second argument was that providing individuals with concrete long term 
leasehold contracts over specific areas of pasture land would be the best way of 
freeing them from the control of state enterprises. Common property systems 
were little known and the types of decentralisation necessary to ensure their 
working were considered to be unlikely by a number of participants.
The pasture law had to recognise the de facto status of state enterprises as 
dispensers of pasture use rights, whilst including provisions promoting access 
20. National Climate Change Strategy of Turkmenistan, Government of Kazakhstan, Astana, 
Ashgabat, 2012.
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for those engaged in collective herding and aimed at avoiding sudden annexa-
tion of pastures by a minority. These include the legal possibility for livestock 
owners to associate and manage pasture in their own right, and provisions for 
a pasture commission, chaired by local village government, to allocate pasture 
between private and state users based on a broader planning mechanism. The 
process of law development was conducted by two international consultants, a 
national lawyer, and a team of Turkmen researchers who conducted both field 
research and a consultative process with government departments [Robinson 
et al. 2015]. The draft was submitted to parliament, where it was amended by 
a parliamentary committee and adopted in August 2015. The amendments 
tended towards strengthening of individual property rights for users, and 
reinforcement of the powers of state enterprises in allocation processes. The 
eventual impact of the law will depend largely on bylaws, which will define the 
statutes of Puas and pasture commissions, and details of pasture allocation 
procedures. The design of these bylaws is to be conducted through a piloting 
process in the field.
Actors: international organisations,  
governments and pasture users
In all the republics, the initial approach taken to reform was one of pasture 
privatisation or leasing – an individualisation of property rights. This occurred 
despite the re-emergence of collective herding systems based on kinship, 
residence and historical precedent which have been observed in Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan and Mongolia. It is not clear why this was the case, 
but certainly the first agrarian reforms experienced in the post-Soviet repub-
lics concerned individualisation of rights to arable land, and Idos were keen to 
stress the strongest possible forms of tenure security for new farmers. It seems 
possible that land codes designed with arable reform in mind were simply 
applied to pastures by default, perhaps hastened by tax-collection require-
ments, or that the same arguments about security of tenure and investment 
were seen to apply equally to arable and pasture lands from the start. Certainly, 
the idea of the tragedy of the commons had been long internalised by Central 
Asian scientists and policy makers, leading naturally to the idea that individ-
uals must be legally bound to individual parcels of land in order to manage 
them properly. Idos have mostly promoted common property regimes, using 
environmental arguments based on a rather different set of ideas about pasto-
ral systems, stressing the importance of mobility and flexibility.
In all cases, except that of Kazakhstan, Idos either directly produced ini-
tial drafts of legislation or participated in the design process, although only 
in Kyrgyzstan did their proposals pass fully into law. They have been involved 
with by-law design and the implementation of legal arrangements on the 
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ground in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and have also been active in com-
munity pasture management projects outside legal frameworks for Cprm 21 
[Upton 2009].
But what of the users themselves? They have so far figured little in 
our narratives of reform, appearing in ‘pilot projects’ and as subjects of the 
research conducted in the field during preparation of draft reforms, for exam-
ple in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Their influence is apparent in Mongolia, 
where a legal framework conceived by drafters as Cprm, has been rejected as 
a form of ‘privatisation for groups’ by herders. Here, consultation appears to 
have been relatively extensive and some level of political feedback from pasture 
users was possible through local elections. In this paper, the low number of 
written local language sources is testament to the problems in transmission 
of knowledge and ideas from the ground-up.
In Kazakhstan, there was no political engagement by herders when the 
leasehold system was introduced during the chaotic 1990s. Livestock owners 
with large or medium-sized herds who have taken out such contracts with 
the district authorities or the forestry department would certainly like to see 
these contracts extended or made permanent [Ferret 2013]. But there has been 
engagement in other ways. Agribusiness firms have been active in policy for-
mulation at the levels of government. Popular protests have put land code 
amendments on hold, although these were not focussed on pastures and amal-
gamated a host of additional concerns. In both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and 
despite the rather different political environments in those two countries, the 
large number of small livestock owners whose interests would appear to be at 
odds with privatisation have been politically non-existent at the national level. 
There have been few organised demands for improved pasture access beyond 
the village commons, even where collective herding institutions are informally 
the norm.
Case studies of pastoralist participation in legislative processes stress the 
role of customary institutions which ensure access, resolve disputes or lobby 
for legislative change at the national level 22. Notable examples, such as those 
from Niger and Mauritania 23 or of reindeer herders in Russian [Donahoe 
2009] are based on a common identity or long history of common property 
or partially regulated open access regimes. However in Central Asia, pastoral-
ists are not a marginalised minority, or at least are not perceived in this way. 
Pastoralism is associated with the majority ethnic group, or is practised by all 
rural inhabitants, but the development of agriculture has reduced its economic 
21. See L. Mansour [op. cit.].
22. The Land we Graze: A Synthesis of Case Studies About How Pastoralists’ Organizations Defend 
Their Land Rights, 2011, Iucn Esaro office, Nairobi, Kenya. 
23. See Réseau des organisations d’éleveurs et pasteurs du Sahel, L’implication de la société civile 
pastorale dans l’élaboration de la loi pastorale au Niger. Quels enseignements ? 2014, (<http://www.
inter-reseaux.org/IMG/pdf/RBM_Code_pastoral_Niger.pdf>) and Wabnitz [op. cit.].
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importance, and it does not occupy the same place in the national culture as 
in Mongolia. There are few groups or organisations not set up by Idos which 
specifically advocate for grazing rights and none which have a national profile. 
Still less evident is the presence of any environmental discourse emanating 
from the users themselves. Several authors working on perceptions of envi-
ronmental change in Kyrgyzstan, have noted that many pastoralists there do 
not perceive degradation in itself as a severe problem 24 [Liechti 2012; Levine et 
al. 2017]. Lack of access to remote grazing and insufficient winter fodder may 
result in damage to more easily accessible pastures, and depending on how 
they are asked, users may mention these underlying issues more often than 
their effects (for example in certain regions of Tajikistan 25). Overall, degrada-
tion per se is less likely to be emphasized by herders than by officials, Idos or 
academics [Levine op. cit.].
In contrast, herders in Mongolia increasingly acknowledge that grow-
ing livestock numbers and declining or unplanned mobility are affecting the 
pastoral resource [Fernandez-Giménez and Batbuyan 2004]. Herders using 
pastures which are more productive or close to settled areas, perceive damage 
to pasture resources to be due to overgrazing by otor livestock from outside 
[Bruegger et al. 2014]. Thus, on one hand flexibility allows pastoralists to access 
pastures, but also increases competition for resources, especially if overarch-
ing regulatory institutions are weak or absent [Fernandez-Giménez 2002].
The extent to which Idos or herders have been able to influence change is 
intimately bound up with the nature of political regime in place in each coun-
try, ranging from relatively open, democratic and decentralised regimes in 
Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan to the authoritarian state apparatus in Turkmenistan.
An environmental discourse?
Environmental discourse arising from ideas of the tragedy of the commons, 
economic theories of private property and concerns over security of tenure, 
the desire to foster the emergence of a ‘modern’ livestock sector, and inter-
ests of large livestock owners with political influence have all been used 
to promote exclusive property rights over pasture. On the other hand, con-
cerns about ecosystem fragmentation, degradation arising from loss of live-
stock mobility and social justice, supported by theories of common property 
 economics have tended to favour the promotion of Cprm or more shifting 
forms of property rights.
24. D. J. Bedunah, Impact of Land Reform on Pastureland, Consultant report to Adb under TA 
2208, 2006.
25. Perceptions of Farmers and Farm Workers on Land Reform and Sustainable Agriculture in 
Tajikistan, World Bank, Usaid, Dfid, 2012. 
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In Central Asia, the reality of informal post-independence pasture man-
agement has ranged from something close to common property regimes (such 
as initially emerged in Kyrgyzstan) to forms of semi-governed open access (as 
described in the case of Turkmenistan). Such regimes are probably both envi-
ronmentally and socially appropriate for this arid and spatially variable region 
of the world, in which a significant part of the livestock inventory is held by 
large numbers of smallholders.
However although such arguments have been promoted by Idos, legal 
frameworks based on individual tenure are more familiar to national policy 
makers, lawyers and researchers. This can be traced to their immediate expe-
riences of arable land reform and the perception that private property rights 
and the associated ‘ranching’ form of pastoralism are modern and more pro-
ductive. There is also some concern amongst these actors that herders without 
legally secure tenure would be at risk. In a low-trust environment, with little 
experience of democratic institutions, to believe that long-term security of 
access might be available within common property institutions constitutes 
a leap of faith which few in Central Asia are prepared to countenance. The 
question of whether low levels of individual investment, perceived by national 
policy makers to be a risk under Cprm, could be made up for by investments 
by (potentially corrupt) pasture management institutions, is also a concern.
Environmental concerns are bound up with institutional structures. 
From the state’s point of view, regulation, control and taxation are part of its 
mandate and all are facilitated by private property regimes. There is a wide-
spread assumption that only enforced adherence to carrying capacity regu-
lations can assure the sustainable management of pastures for generations 
to come and that this would be easier to enforce under a private property or 
leasehold system.
The perception that herders lack the knowledge or understanding to 
manage their pastures properly and must be supported to make the right deci-
sions is held also by many Ido staff and local experts and manifests itself in 
the form of community pasture management planning. This process consists 
of a detailed inventory of pasture composition and productivity and estima-
tion of the carrying capacity of different areas in order to decide how many 
animals should graze there 26, a routine process during the Soviet period. 
User  committees are then responsible to implement these plans accordingly, 
in order to ensure environmental sustainability.
26. United Nations Development Programme, Pasture Management in an Electronic Format. 
Best Practice Replication of the “Demonstrating Sustainable Mountain Pasture Management in the 
Suusamyr Valley, Kyrgyzstan”, Project implemented by Unpd funded by Gef (2008-2013) in 
frames of the Unpd - Unep Poverty and Environment Initiative, 2014, (<https://www.unpei.org/
sites/default/files/e_library_documents/Kyrgyzstan_Sustainable_Development_Program_
eng_2013-2017.pdf>).
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Regardless of tenure regime, lessons from other parts of the world regard-
ing the difficulties of enforcement of fixed stocking rates [Bartels et al. 1993], 
massive margins of error inherent in carrying capacity calculations 27 and 
changing thinking amongst rangeland scientists on the utility of this type 
of management paradigm [Huntsinger 2016] appear to be absent from the 
conversation in Central Asia. Few policy makers or rangelands scientists in 
the region have much faith that pasture users can optimise stocking pressure 
without the existence of detailed scientifically based grazing plans, or question 
the time and expense of preparing them.
Yet, there is a growing body of evidence that herders are rational actors. 
Recent research has shown that where costs (whether social, economic or 
administrative) to movement are low, herders respond by matching stocking 
rates to the availability of those resources which they consider of primary 
importance, and which may include water as well as forage [Behnke et al. 
2016; Moritz et al. 2014; Scholte et al. 2006]. Where such matching is not 
occurring, a suite of biological and economic trade-offs influence decision 
making in a statistically predictable – and thus rational manner [Kerven et al. 
2016a; Kraudzun 2012; Robinson et al. 2016, 2017].
So where does this leave our environmental discourse? Such a discourse is 
used by both Idos and governments to present the problem – which is usually 
that pastures are degraded. However, both the reasons given: which may be 
reduced to a ‘tragedy of the commons’ type discourse, and arguments focussing 
on issues of ecological fragmentation and livestock mobility are quite different. 
The resulting solutions – forms of individual property rights or regimes based 
on Cprm – are diametrically opposed. Pasture users appear perhaps less con-
cerned with degradation in itself, but may employ environmental arguments 
to achieve their aims, which are essentially pasture access. This phenomenon 
of groups invoking international environmental discourses for local political 
ends can be seen elsewhere [e.g. Sundberg 1998]. As we have seen however, 
the pastoralist community in Central Asia is highly heterogeneous and lacks a 
unified agenda. For smaller owners, forms of common property may be in their 
interest, but these livestock owners tend to be unaware of formal examples of 
these elsewhere, and are in any case unrepresented. Idos attempt to represent 
the supposed interests of these users, but must in effect do so without them, as 
they participate so little in the process. There is little evidence so far that larger 
livestock owners with stand-alone herds would lose out in a common property 
regime, but they are unlikely to specifically promote such a system as they 
prefer the control associated with exclusive individual rights. Such groups tend 
to be better connected and informed both legally and politically.
27. J. Djikman, “Carrying Capacity: Outdated Concept or Useful Livestock Management Tool?” 
Livestock; coping with drought. Fao/Odi, 1998 (<https://www.scribd.com/document/54098710/
dijkman>).
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Central Asian policy makers would have to be convinced that the forms 
of pasture management and allocation likely to emerge under Cprm would be 
sufficiently representative, protective of user rights and amenable to control, to 
prefer such a system over the certainties of leasing or private property arrange-
ments. They would have to be aware of the scientific evidence for negative 
impacts of such tenure systems on poorly productive heterogeneous range-
lands. Much depends on the ability to compare the relative benefits of different 
systems in context. It has been suggested that promotion of Cprm by Idos is 
rather naïve, because communities are heterogeneous and elites likely to gain 
preferential access to pasture [Dörre 2015; Jacquesson 2010]. However, wealth 
disparities exist in all common property systems, some of which have endured 
for centuries [Ostrom 1990; Stevenson 1991]. There is not yet any evidence that 
inequalities of access under Cprm in Kyrgyzstan system are any greater than 
those associated with the leasing system which came before it, or a system of 
private property, which would make such disparities permanent.
R. Neudert [2015] suggests that exclusive tenure rights are compatible 
with mobile pastoralism and that binary categories of exclusive individual or 
communal tenure may not cover the range of institutional possibilities avail-
able. Certainly in Azerbaijan the leasing system described by the author has 
not inhibited transhumant systems and in Kazakhstan many of the larger live-
stock owners are increasingly mobile and able to acquire access arrangements 
in different seasonal pastures [Ferret 2013; Kerven et al. 2016b]. However, in 
both of these cases mobility concerns livestock owners having several hundred 
sheep equivalents, whilst smaller owners remain clustered around settlements 
all year around. In much of Central Asia, the discussion around mobility and 
tenure systems often concerns precisely these smaller owners, who are numer-
ous and collectively own a large proportion (or even the majority) of national 
inventories [Robinson et al. 2012]. Whilst some in this category use collective 
herding mechanisms to achieve high levels of mobility, others do not, particu-
larly in Kazakhstan where they are largely sedentary (although the reasons 
for this may be as much economic and social as related to the tenure system 
[Kerven et al. 2016b]).
In both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, in areas where pressure on pastures 
is low, some users currently gain informal access to pastures through rela-
tionships with leaseholders or their shepherds, and other semi-legal collective 
arrangements. But a leasing system is only likely to provide groups of small 
owners with formal access to remote pastures if: (i) it includes the possibil-
ity to conclude group contracts; (ii) allocation procedures are made on some 
basis other than ‘first come first serve’; (iv) leasing periods are short and (iii) 
transaction costs of land registration low. We are not aware of any such system 
currently working in practice, although attempts have been made to include 
some of these elements in the new Turkmen law.
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Other ways around the binary categorization of tenure systems concern 
the application of different regimes to different parts of pastoral systems, 
depending on the value of the resource 28 and exist in much of mountainous 
Europe, where high value or improved pastures are private, and remote, poorly 
productive or temporary pastures owned by state or local government and 
managed by users [Stevenson 1991]. It should be noted however that the idea 
of presenting communities with a choice of leasing or common property on 
the same pasture lands is a false precept, as once leasing is possible, increasing 
livestock numbers or demand for animal products is likely to result in a rush 
to rent pasture, [Neudert and Rühs 2013] and a reduction in informal access 
arrangements with leaseholders [Kerven et al. 2016b]. This is one of the obsta-
cles to promotion of incremental change or local solutions – which become 
problematic once exclusive long term individual property rights become a legal 
possibility.
Incremental change is perhaps easier where a basic framework for 
common property management is in place, which could facilitate emergence 
of multiple forms of pasture user groups and governance systems. In France 
and Switzerland, transhumant systems bear many parallels to those of moun-
tainous parts of Central Asia, and, as in Kyrgyzstan, pastures are allocated 
to local government and managed by users. The common and fundamental 
basis for primary user rights is based on residency and inscribed in law, but 
user groups formed and organized in different ways over a long period of 
time, each with its own rules regarding secondary membership rights, exclu-
sion and reciprocity and fees [Eychenne 2006; Stevenson 1991]. In order for 
even such a loose system to work, minimum conditions had to include a ban 
on private property, a universal definition or understanding of primary user 
rights backed by the state, and government-supported mechanisms for conflict 
resolution and pasture access across administrative boundaries. In Mongolia, 
where spatial and social boundaries for managing pastoral commons are vague 
and permeable, such higher level institutions may be particularly important. 
Although experiences from donor supported herder groups have produced 
some positive social outcomes [Fernandez-Giménez et al. 2015 ; Upton 2008], 
there is less evidence for positive ecological outcomes. Vegetation and soil stud-
ies were conducted on winter grazing pastures of paired districts with formal 
Cbrm and non-Cbrm groups. Of between 64 and 71 test comparisons at sites 
in four ecological zones, only 5-9% showed significant differences concern-
ing  vegetation biomass and cover, species richness and diversity, soil surface 
characteristics, vegetation forage quality or palatability [Chantsallkham 2015]. 
28. L. Mendes, “Private and Communal Land Tenure in Morocco’s Western high Atlas 
Mountains: Complements, not Ideological Opposites”, Annual Meeting of the Society for Range 
Management, held in Boise, Idaho, February 12 1986, 1988 (<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.
uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/5335.pdf>).
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The herder group approach alone, where groups are small and boundaries 
undefined, may not be sufficient in managing arid rangelands without forms 
of institutional regulation at higher levels.
In the processes examined here, knowledge has played a crucial role. In 
Central Asia particularly, policy has not been sufficiently informed by exam-
ples and debates from outside the region. Travel costs, language barriers, poor 
internet penetration and long isolation under the Soviet Union have meant that 
the only examples available have been those (selectively) brought to the table 
by Idos. In Tajikistan, for example, draft pasture laws have been informed by 
pasture use planning in Mongolia, Afghanistan, a national park in California, 
and most significantly by Kyrgyzstan’s experience. Ido employees in Tajikistan 
have complained that they repeatedly make “study trips” to Kyrgyzstan without 
being able to see how pastures are legislated in other countries throughout the 
world. This has undermined the ability of policy makers to make informed 
decisions themselves, a problem exacerbated by the speed with which reforms 
have been designed and implemented. It is notable in Mongolia that the idea of 
Cprm has long been understood and debated at national level, a principle argu-
ment against it being that such systems, far from being too open, are not open 
enough. Whether or not diverse and strong Ido engagement played a role, the 
fact that the draft law has still not been passed after more than ten years, is tes-
tament to the sophistication of the debate in that country. Collective planning 
and repair of key infrastructure by Ido-funded herder groups demonstrate 
that Kyrgyzstan is not the only regional example 29 of collective options for 
rangeland management [Fernandez-Giménez et al. 2012].
Conclusion
To conclude, we find that environmental discourse somewhat misses the heart 
of the problems of pasture property rights regimes; opposing discourses have 
been used by Idos and local policy makers to promote completely different 
tenure systems. The arguments that truly concern resource users centre upon 
the type of regime that best enables them to maximise benefits from those 
livestock which they own, not maintain pasture condition per se. Of course, 
these aims are often aligned, but in some cases, neither is attained, at least 
for a subset of users. In such cases, it is common to suppose that users must 
be ‘made’ to manage their pastures properly either through controlled leasing 
or through training and pasture planning. But it is increasingly understood 
that herders react to environmental, social and economic circumstances in 
statistically predictable ways, suggesting that decision making is a response to 
29. Project Annual Report, GreenGold, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation, 2010.
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constraints and not a lack of knowledge or planning. The search for improved 
legal frameworks is certainly important in this respect, but as we have seen, 
the introduction of new ideas is extremely difficult. Central Asian policy 
makers and scientists could be encouraged to consider informal practises in 
their own countries as potential starting points for legislative development, 
and to assess potential options in the context of regimes in place elsewhere, 
according to their environmental and social implications. More broadly, policy 
should focus less on monitoring of pasture condition, control, regulation and 
institutional micro-management, and more on understanding and reducing 
the constraints to pasture access and livestock mobility, whether these be legal, 
administrative or economic.
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Abstract
Pastoral property rights in Central Asia. Factors and actors driving the reform agenda
This paper examines the roles of the state, international organisations and the 
public in pastoral land reform in the Central Asian republics and Mongolia. 
In recent years new legislation has been passed in most of these countries, 
often driven by environmental concerns. In the development of these laws, 
international organisations tend to promote common property regimes, whilst 
governments usually emphasise individual security of tenure, each using envi-
ronmental arguments taken from quite different bodies of theory. With the 
exception of Mongolia, pressure for reform from users themselves has been 
weak and focussed more on social and economic issues than on environmen-
tal problems. Across the region informal grazing practices facilitate the match-
ing of stocking pressure to forage resources; legal frameworks which build on 
these are most likely to lead to sustainable pasture management.
Keywords: Central Asia, environment, land degradation, livestock, pastoralism, property rights
Résumé
Droits fonciers pastoraux et discours environnemental en Asie centrale : facteurs et 
acteurs influençant les réformes
L’article examine les rôles joués respectivement par l’État, les organisations 
internationales et la population dans les réformes du régime foncier pastoral 
en Asie centrale et en Mongolie. Dans ces pays, de nouvelles lois ont été récem-
ment promulguées, souvent motivées par un souci environnemental. Dans 
la plupart des cas, les organisations internationales promeuvent les régimes 
de propriété communautaire, tandis que les gouvernements soulignent la 
sécurité de la propriété individuelle, chacun mettant en avant des arguments 
écologiques divergents. En dehors de la Mongolie, les usagers des pâtures eux-
mêmes n’ont que faiblement influencé ces réformes, leurs préoccupations 
étant d’ordre économique et social bien plus qu’environnemental. Dans cette 
vaste région, les pratiques de pâcage informel facilitent l’adéquation entre la 
charge et les ressources pastorales, aussi les dispositifs légaux basés sur ce 
principe sont plus à même de conduire à une gestion durable des pâtures.
Mots clés : Asie centrale, environnement, dégradation des terres, bétail, pastoralisme, régime 
foncier
